FICAM SAML CSP Authentication Context Value, v1.0
Valid AuthnContextClassRef in AuthnStatement (ValidAuthnContextStep)
Is the Authentication Context Class Reference valid and correctly representative of the type of user authentication that occurred? The assessor needs to provide evidence of the validity of the authentication context; for core SAML Authentication Context classes it is sufficient to document the authentication process with text (or screenshots). The assessor must include evidence (trustmark links or other audit details) for all required trustmarks, if the CSP uses the ICAM defined levels of assurance:
Proof of Authn Context Validity
If a standard ICAM accepted SAML Authentication Context Class is used, please provide screenshots or a description of the authentication process. Otherwise, please include a list of trustmarks or audit details that validate the CSP is authorized to use the approved Federal LOA authentication context classes.
Conformance Criteria (1)
Supporting Federal Government LoA SAML Authentication Context Classes
If a FICAM Credential Service Provider has been granted all of the appropriate FICAM Level of Assurance Trustmarks for a given Level of Assurance, then they may then use the following Federal Level of Assurance Authentication Context Class references URIs within SAML Assertions:
Section 3.1 Standard Assurance Level URIs
|Trustmark Reference Attribute||https://artifacts.trustmarkinitiative.org/lib/trustmark-definitions/ficam-saml-csp-authentication-context-value/1.0//trustmark-reference/|
|Keywords||FICAM, SAML, Authentication Context Classes, Authentication, CSP, Credential Service Provider, IDP, Identity Provider, Interoperability,|
|Assessment Step Preface||
This assessment should be done in parallel with the assessment for the FICAM SAML SSO for CSPs assessment as this trustmark only has meaning when issued in tandem with that trustmark. These tools may be found useful:
The assessor's test Service Provider must be configured to trust the CSP being evaluated. Additionally, the IDP being evaluated must be configured to trust the test Service Provider.
|Target Stakeholder||Organizations that have a vested interest in the U.S. Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) program and its technical specifications.|
|Target Recipient||Credential Service Providers that wish to provide their users with access to Relying Party services offered by U.S. federal government agencies and other organizations that have adopted the FICAM SAML SSO Profile.|
|Target Relying Party||Relying Parties that wish to conform to the FICAM SAML SSO Profile and/or interoperate with Identity Providers that conform to the FICAM SAML SSO Profile.|
|Target Provider||Trust Framework Providers (TFPs) that are approved under the FICAM TFS program.|
|Provider Eligibility Criteria||Any organization or business entity may act as a Trustmark Provider for trustmarks under this Trustmark Definition.|
|Assessor Qualifications||Any individual employed or contracted by the Trustmark Provider may act as the assessor for trustmarks under this Trustmark Definition.|
|Trustmark Revocation Criteria||For any trustmark issued under this Trustmark Definition, the Trustmark Provider must revoke the trustmark upon any condition whereby one or more Conformance Criteria cease to be satisfied.|
|Extension Description||This Trustmark Definition requires no extension data.|
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|FICAM-TFS-Scheme||FICAM TFS Scheme Profile Adoption Process 2.0|
An account is used to associate transactional records with an end user or organization. Presence of an account does not necessarily mean that there are credentials (e.g., username and password) associated with the account.
To make a statement about the properties of a user or user's act of authentication.
Period of time that an end user remains trusted after the end user authenticates. That is because an IDP typically does not require an end user to re-authenticate for every page requested. Each IDP defines its own authentication session duration. If an end user returns to the IDP and an earlier authentication session has expired, the IDP re-authenticates the end user even if single sign-on is in effect.
Mappings of SAML request-response message exchanges onto standard messaging or communication protocols.
A single XML file containing a top-level root <md:EntitiesDescriptor> containing multiple <md:EntityDescriptor> and/or <md:EntitiesDescriptor> elements.
|Credential Service Provider||CSP||
For the purposes of SAML SSO, they are synonymous with Identity Providers.
Private key data encryption that converts data into a form that cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people. Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its original form, so it can be understood. Within the FICAM SAML Profile, encryption pertains to SSL v3 or TLS 1.1 (and higher), encryption and/or XML encryption, depending upon the Level of Assurance.
An asymmetric key operation where the private key is used to digitally sign an electronic document and the public key is used to verify the signature. Digital signatures provide authentication and integrity protection.
Process of an end user finding a IDP and/or RP.
|Extensible Markup Language||XML||
XML is a specification developed by the W3C that enables the definition, transmission, validation, and interpretation of data between applications and between organizations. In a nutshell, XML describes data and focuses on what data is. XML facilitates technical interoperability, and is used in identity management standards such as SAML (e.g., to convey information in a SAML assertion).
|Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Trust Framework Solutions||FICAM TFS||
The Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Trust Framework Solutions (TFS) program is is the federated identity framework for the U.S. Federal Government. It includes guidance, processes, and supporting infrastructure to enable secure and streamlined citizen and business facing online service delivery.
A holder-of-key assertion contains a reference to a public key (corresponding to a private key) or a symmetric key possessed by the end user. The RP requires the end user to prove possession of the private key or secret that is referenced in the assertion. In proving possession, the end user also proves that he or she is the rightful owner of the assertion.
For the purposes of SAML SSO, they are synonymous with Credential Service Providers. A kind of service provider that creates, maintains, and manages identity information for principals and provides principal authentication to other service providers (relying parties) within a federation, such as with web browser profiles.
Information shared between endpoints (e.g., RP, IDP) necessary for technical interoperation.
Ability to maintain data.
A session wherein messages between two participants are encrypted and integrity is protected using a set of shared secrets called session keys. A participant is said to be authenticated if, during the session, he, she or it proves possession of a long term token in addition to the session keys, and if the other party can verify the identity associated with that token. If both participants are authenticated, the protected session is said to be mutually authenticated. One way to implement a protected session is SSL/TLS, which is required for this Profile.
Private end user pseudonym that will only be used with one site. The site will always know it's you when you come back, but it won't be able to look up any other information about you, or correlate your profile with other sites.
A system entity (i.e., stand-alone system or group of applications that rely on a central authentication system) that decides to take an action based on information from another system entity. For example, a SAML Relying Party depends on receiving assertions from an asserting party (e.g., a SAML Identity Provider) about a subject. A Relying Party is also referred to as a Service Provider.
|Security Assertion Markup Language||SAML||
The set of specifications describing security assertions that are encoded in XML, profiles for attaching the assertions to various protocols and frameworks, the request/response protocol used to obtain the assertions, and bindings of this protocol to various transfer protocols (for example, SOAP and HTTP). SAML addresses web single sign-on, web services authentication, attribute exchange, authorization, non-repudiation, and secure communications. SAML defines assertion message formats that are referenced in Liberty Alliance, Shibboleth, WS-Security, and other specifications. SAML has become the standard web SSO identity management solution. Several versions have been released to date, including SAML 1.0, SAML 1.1, and SAML 2.0. The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) oversees SAML.
|Security Token Service||STS||
An STS provides a standards-based method of converting security tokens across different formats.
For the purpose of SAML SSO, they are synonymous with Relying Parties. Service Providers generate SAML AuthnRequests, provide users with discovery interfaces, consume SAML Responses, and generally provide some sort of service or capability for a user.
The process of checking the digital signature by reference to the original message and a given public key, thereby determining whether the digital signature was created for that same message using the private key that corresponds to the referenced public key.
Once an end user has authenticated their identity at an IDP, he or she may, by their choice, move among RPs that interoperate with the IDP without re-authenticating. In other words, the end user is seamlessly logged into any other RP that interoperates with the IDP. For privacy considerations, end users must take explicit actions to opt-in to SSO. In addition, SSO is in effect only for the duration of the end user's current browser session and authentication session.